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CASE NOTES
Federal Power Commission—Approval of Securities Issue by Pub-
lic Utility—Duty to Investigate Allegations of Anticompetitive Con-
duct Raised by Intervenors in a Section 204 Proceeding—Gulf
States Utilities Co. v. FPC.'—In October 1970, Gulf States Utilities
Company (Gulf States), 2 in compliance with section 204 of the
Federal Power Act (the Act), 3 applied to the Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC or the Commission) for authority to sell $30 million of
first mortgage, long-term bonds at competitive bidding to refinance
part of its outstanding short-term commercial paper and notes.
When the Commission filed notice of Gulf States' application, the
Cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana (the Cities) filed a
protest and motion to intervene in the proceedings before the Com-
mission. The Cities alleged that Gulf States, together with two other
public utility companies, had engaged in a conspiracy beginning in
1968 to thwart the implementation of an interconnection and pool-
ing agreement involving the Cities, Dow Chemical Company (which
had a generating plant), and Louisiana Electric Cooperative, Inc. (a
super-cooperative in the business of generating and transmitting
electric energy). The Cities asserted that the pooling arrangement
would assure a market for the parties' surplus electric energy, would
coordinate, at substantial savings, the construction of new
generators, and would increase the reliability of electric power to the
pool members.
In 1964, Louisiana Electric Cooperative had applied to the
Rural Electrification Administration (REA) for loans to finance the
construction of generation and transmission facilities to serve its
member utilities. The Cities claimed that Gulf States and the two
other utility companies resorted to repeated litigation to block con-
struction of these facilities and succeeded in delaying the loans for
five years. The REA loans were made in 1969, but were by then
insufficient to cover the cost of building the generating station and
transmission lines due to increased costs. As a result, the pool
members were forced to negotiate with Gulf States for the use of its
411 U.S. 747 (1973).
2 Gulf States, a Texas corporation qualified to do business in Louisiana, is a public utility
within the meaning of § 201(e) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (1970). 411 U.S.
at 750. Gulf States is primarily engaged in the business of generating, distributing and selling
electric energy in southeastern Texas and south central Louisiana. Id.
5
 16 U.S.C.• 	 § 824c (1970)• Section 824c(a) states:
No public utility shall issue any security . . . unless and until, and then only to the
extent that, upon application by' the public utility, the Commission by order au-
thorizes such issue . . . The Commission shall make such order only if it finds that
such issue . . . (a) is for some lawful object, within the corporate purposes of the
applicant and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate
for or consistent with the proper performance by the applicant of service as a public
utility and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is
reasonably necessary or appropriate for such purposes.
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transmission lines. The Cities contended that Gulf States continued
to block and limit the plans of the pooling agreement by forcing
them to agree to limit their power output in return for the use of the
lines. The Cities, therefore, sought to intervene in Gulf States'
application before the FPC, maintaining that the proceeds of the
proposed $30 million bond issue would be used to finance Gulf
States' alleged anticompetitive conduct. The Cities requested that
the Commission proscribe these alleged antitrust violations by plac-
ing limits or conditions on the approval of Gulf States' application. 4
The Federal Power Commission granted the Cities' motion to
intervene but declined to hold a formal hearing on the bond issue,
asserting that the grievances which the Cities raised had no rele-
vance to a section 204 proceeding and that the FPC could render
none of the requested relief. 5 The Cities' petition for a rehearing°
was denied by the FPC. 7 The Cities then appealed the FPC's order
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 8 That court, in a unanimous decision, disagreed with the
Commission's position that the Cities' allegations were irrelevant to
the securities issue and remanded the case to the FPC for considera-
tion of the Cities' claims. 9
After this decision, Gulf States sought review by the Supreme
Court. In its Memorandum in Opposition to the grant of certiorari,
the FPC stated that, although it agreed with Gulf States that the
court of appeals had misconstrued section 204, the Commission
would follow the court's ruling because it would not seriously
impede the Commission's ability to perform its statutory
responsibilities.'° The Supreme Court declined to accept the
Commission's position" and HELD: the FPC must keep a clear
record of its findings and conclusions and, because of its statutory
duty under section 204, must consider allegations of anticompetitive
4 This statement of facts is taken from 411 U.S. at 751-53.
5 The Commission ruled:
The requested approval of the issuance of the Bonds allow {sic] the Company only to
change the form of a portion of its outstanding indebtedness, it does not call for the
initiation of any construction or other program by the Company which might effect
[sic] the interest of the Petitioners, The alleged violations which petitioners attempt
to raise in this proceeding are irrelevant to a requested authorization of securities.
There is no relief that the Commission can order in authorizing the issuance of the
Bonds, for refinancing purposes that would have any effect on the interest of the
Petitioners, or solve any of the problems outlined by them.
44 F.P.C. 1524, 1525 (1970), as quoted in 411 U.S. at 753 (emphasis added).
6 Required by § 313(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(a) (1970).
411 U.S. at 754.
" City of Lafayette v. FPC, 454 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Section 313(b) of the Federal
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1970), provides for such review.
9 454 F.2d at 953.
I° Memorandum of 'the Federal Power Commission in Opposition at 4, Gulf States
Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Memorandum in Opposition].
II The Court stated: "Inasmuch as the decision of the Court of Appeals raised issues of
potential and recurring importance with respect to the authorization of securities by the
Federal Power Commission, we granted certiorari." 411 U.S, at 755.
579
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
conduct to determine whether a securities issue will be compatible
with the public interest. 12
This note will explore the implications of Gulf States Utilities
for the administrative procedures to be followed and the proper
scope of inquiry when the Federal Power Commission considers the
"public interest" in a proceeding under section 204 of the Federal
Power Act. The first part will describe the narrower grounds of
administrative procedure upon which the Supreme Court's decision
rests. Next, the more general directive which the Court gave to the
FPC concerning inquiries in the "public interest" will be investi-
gated. Finally, the effect of Gulf States Utilities on the electric
utility industry will be examined.
I. THE FPC's ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
UNDER SECTION 204
The procedural aspect of the Gulf States Utilities case led the
Supreme Court to emphasize the requirement that the FPC provide
an administrative record which clearly supports its actions." Ac-
cording to the Court, one of the principal faults of the Commission's
disposition of the Cities' claims in Gulf States Utilities was• its
summary nature. Without a record stating the Commission's reasons
for its action," especially when it declined to hold a hearing on the
allegations, a court could not "closely scrutinize" the propriety of the
Commission's disposition." As stated by the court of appeals:
[Tjhe FPC's terse and cryptic statement did not comply
with the requirement we see in Denver & Rio Grande, that
the agency's reason for denying or deferring hearing of
anticompetitive issues must be clear on the record, mean-
ingful in findings or discussion.' 6
Although the Commission's discretion under the Federal Power
Act is not circumscribed in any significant respect as 'a result of Gulf
States Utilities, the FPC must continue to justify its administrative
decisions under the Act. The requirement of an adequate record
12 Id. at 762-64.
13 Id. at 763.
14
 The lack of an adequate record has resulted in the remand of a number of cases to the
FPC for consideration of additional relevant matters and for explanation of the FPC's ruling
in light of these additional matters. See, e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (licensing
investigation too narrow; record insufficient to support conclusions); Scenic Hudson Preserva-
tion Conference v. FPC, 354 F,2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (same);
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 913
(1960) , (investigation into application for abandonment of gas service by company was to
limited; record insufficient).
15
 411 U.S. at 763-64.
16 454 F.2d at 953. See Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S.
485 (1967), discussed in text at notes 103-08 infra.
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serves to ensure that the Commission's discretionary powers will be
exercised in a reasonable and appropriate manner." Further, the
maintenance of an adequate record in a case such as Gulf States
Utilities will encourage thorough investigation of all relevant factors
under the appropriate sections of the Federal Power Act. The rele-
vant factors which the FPC must consider in a section 204 proceed-
ing are elucidated in the gloss which the Court placed on that section
in the balance of the opinion.
In Gulf States Utilities the Supreme Court declared that an-
ticompetitive conduct is a relevant factor to be considered in pro-
ceedings under section 204. This decision will undoubtedly increase
the scope and depth of investigations which the FPC must conduct
regarding some applications for securities issuances by public
utilities.' However, investigations of antitrust violations are not
foreign to the Commission. The FPC has conducted such investiga-
tions in proceedings under other provisions of the Federal Power
Act." Therefore, the requirement that the Commission investigate
similar allegations under section 204 imposes no unusual burden. 2 °
As the Court pointed out, if the FPC considers charges of anticom-
petitive conduct "at a pre-issue stage [it] may avoid the need later to
unravel complex transactions in granting relief under the antitrust
laws or other sections of the Federal Power Act." 2 '
The reasoning in Gulf States Utilities suggests a two-step
analysis of allegations of anticompetitive conduct under section 204.
First, the FPC must determine whether the alleged acts are within
its regulatory jurisdiction and colorably constitute violations of the
antitrust laws. 22 Secondly, if such violations are found, the FPC
must ascertain whether a sufficient nexus exists between the viola-
tions and the purpose of the securities issue. 23 If the Commission
concludes that the allegations warrant serious consideration, it may
take any one of four modes of action. The Commission may: (a)
defer approval of the securities issue until an investigation of the
antitrust charges is completed; (b) grant the authority to issue the
securities and defer consideration of the allegations to a later time;
(c) condition the approval of the issue upon the utility's agreement to
17
 L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action poi. (1965).
IN "Inclusion of these national policies in the public interest significantly expands tradi-
tional agency considerations." Comment, Administrative Agencies, the Public Interest, and
National Policy: Is a Marriage Possible?, 59 Geo. Li. 420, 426 (1970).
19 The FPC admitted that allegations of anticompetitive conduct may properly be raised
and considered in proceedings under § 202, 16 U.S.C. § 824a (1970) (interconnections); § 203,
16 U.S.C. § 824b (1970) (dispositions and mergers); §§ 205 and 206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e
(1970) (rates and rate-making practices); and § 207, 16 U.S.C. § 824f (1970) (adequacy of
service). 411 U.S. at. 757.
20 The FPC has admitted as much. Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 10, at 4.
21 411 U.S. at 760.
" Id. at 758-59.
23
 Id. at 759.
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cease its illegal activities; or (d) grant part of the requested authori-
zation and defer part while the antitrust allegations are
investigated. 24
The course which the Commission chooses will depend in large
measure upon the purpose for which the securities will be used and
the surrounding circumstances. Thus, if there is an immediate need
for capital or the securities market seems likely to take an unfavor-
able turn, 25 the Commission may chOose to grant wholly or partially
the authorization and consider the anticompetitive conduct at a later
time. Should the Commission subsequently determine that there is
sufficient merit to the claims of antitrust activity, it may modify its
previous approval of the securities issue. 26 It may also forward such
information to the Attorney General of the United States for appro-
priate action. 27 At its discretion, therefore, the Commission may
adopt any one or a combination of the above procedures.
Because the FPC has been given wide discretion in its adminis-
trative determinations by the Federal Power Act, the necessity of
maintaining a complete record is paramount. This is especially clear
given the general realities of political life with respect to a scarce
energy source. The FPC, as an agency of the executive branch
whose members are appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Congress, is susceptible to political pressure from these
branches. 28 In addition, the electric power industry lobbies inten-
sively to influence the passage and enforcement of regulatory legisla-
tion and also seeks to influence administrative decisions by the
regulatory agency itself. 29 Since lobbying to influence the actions of
government bodies or administrative agencies is not vulnerable to
attack on antitrust grounds, 3° the only means by which the courts
34
 Id. at 762. See also 454 F.2d at 953-54.
" The FPC expressed concern in this regard in Pacific Power & Light Co., 27 F.P.C.
623, 629 (1962), discussed in text at notes 42-52 infra.
" Pursuant to § 204(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824c(b) (1970), the
Commission may issue supplemental orders modifying any grant of authorization. These
orders may modify the purposes, uses and extent to which, or the conditions under which, any
securities previously authorized may be applied.
27 Federal Power ACt. § 314(a), 16 U.S.C. § 825m(a) (1970). The FPC has no direct
authority to prosecute antitrust violations as do some other regulatory agencies. Under § 11 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970), only the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board and the Federal Trade Commission may prosecute certain antitrust violations.
35
 See, e.g., L. Kohlmeier, Jr., The Regulators 29-104 (1969); Loevinger, Regulation and
Competition as Alternatives, 11 Antitrust Bull. 101, 137-38 (1966); cf. L. Jaffe, supra note 17,
at 11.
29 See authorities cited in note 28 supra. Gulf States mounted an intensive public
relations and lobbying drive against Louisiana Electric Cooperative in an attempt to block
action favorable to the pooling agreement. 411 U.S. at 752.
3°
 .The Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the Sherman Act do not apply to
associations which seek to influence the legislature or the executive through political means to
take particular action with respect to the enactment or enfOrcement of laws. Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). This applies even
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may ascertain whether the Commission arrived at its decision for
improper reasons is to require a record stating those reasons.
In light of this great latitude afforded the Commission in exer-
cising its regulatory powers, the fears expressed in Mr. Justice
Powell's dissenting opinion in Gulf States Utilities appear unwar-
ranted. He stated that if the majority found the Cities' claims to be
colorably valid and related to the proposed securities issue, then "it
is unlikely that any claim can be found wholly irrelevant." 31 How-
ever, this contention is undercut - in at least two important respects.
First, the Cities' allegation that Gulf States violated the antitrust
laws by engaging them in repetitive litigation in order to impede the
implementation of the pooling agreement would, if proven, consti-
tute a violation of the antitrust laws. In California Motor Transport
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 32
 the Supreme Court held that a pattern
of repetitive, baseless claims asserted in courts or before administra-
tive agencies by one competitor against another to weaken or de-
stroy him, was violative of the antitrust laws because such "sham"
proceedings denied the responding party free access to the courts
and administrative agencies. 33 The main purpose of such proceed-
ings was to "interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor . . .."34
 On their face, then, the Cities' claims colorably
constituted a contravention of the antitrust laws.
Secondly, it could be argued that the proceeds from the pro-
posed securities issue would be used to support Gulf States' litigation
against the Cities or to finance the construction of larger generation
plants and thereby place the Cities' power pool at a severe economic
and competitive disadvantage." The Court recognized that the
nexus between the alleged anticompetitive conduct and the securities
issue in this case appeared tenuous. 36
 However, the thrust of the
majority's directive to the FPC upon remand was not that the
Commission give great weight to the claimed nexus, but that the
FPC provide something more than "an inadequate explanation of its
reasons for disposing of the Cities' objections on their merits, if that
in fact is what occurred."37
 The Court did not rule out the possibil-
ity that the Commission could justifiably reject the Cities' claims
upon remand. 38
 What was demanded
 by the
 Court was that the
where such action might'produce a restraint on trade or create a monopoly. Id. at 136. But see
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), where the Court
refused to extend the Noerr rule to situations where associations of persons attempt to use the
courts and administrative agencies as vehicles to restrain trade.
31
 411 U.S. at 776 (dissenting opinion).
32
 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
33
 Id. at 510-11; accord, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380
(1973).
34 404 U.S at 511.
35 Cf. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377.
36 411 U.S. at 763.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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Commission exercise its discretion only after taking a "hard look" 39
at all of the relevant facts and allegations presented by all interested
parties.
In addition to its directive to maintain an adequate record, the
Court has provided guidelines for the FPC when it conducts an
investigation under section 204. Principally, the Court concluded
that antitrust issues are relevant in such a proceeding. The next part
of this note will investigate the Court's incorporation of antitrust
policies into the concept of the "public interest."
II. THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" OF SECTION 204.
In Gulf States Utilities, the Supreme Court did not confine the
scope of its holding to the limited administrative directive to the
FPC. Instead, the Court found it necessary to amplify its holding by
clarifying some of the issues which are relevant to the concept of the
"public interest" in section 204. The reasoning behind the Court's
inclusion of antitrust issues in the "public interest" becomes clearer
through an investigation of the FPC's position regarding section 204
proceedings, the wording of section 204 itself, and the developing
case law dealing with the responsibility of regulatory agencies to
protect the "public interest."
A. The Commission's View
Section 204 of the Federal Power Act deals with securities
transactions of public utility companies. 4 ° It places such transactions
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. In its
regulatory capacity, the FPC must determine that, inter alia, a
proposed issuance of securities will be "compatible with the public
interest."'"
Before Gulf States Utilities, the only other occasion on which
the FPC was called upon to interpret this phrase was in 1962 in
Pacific Power & Light Co. 42 In Pacific Power & Light the FPC was
required to determine whether the issuance of securities to finance
the proposed construction of a 500 megawatt power line between
Klamath Falls, Oregon and Round Mountain, California would be
"compatible with the public interest." Three commissioners con-
cluded that such a requirement was met when the issuance was
found to be lawful and within corporate purposes. 43 Specifically, the
Commission held that the "plain purpose of Section 204 is to prevent
39
 454 F.2d at 954.
49
 For the text of § 204, see note 3 supra.
41 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a)(a) (1970).
42
 27 F.P.C. 623 (1962).'But cf. Black Hills Power & Light Co., 31 F.P.C. 1605 (1964),
and Black Hills Power & Light Co., 28 F.P.C. 1121 (1962), where the FPC was considering a
securities issue under § 204 in a stock option plan for company executives. The Commission
reaffirmed the position taken in Pacific Power & Light, 28 F. P.C. at 1125, and once again
equated the public interest with financial considerations, 31 F.P.C. at 1611.
43
 27 F.P.C. at 628.
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the issuance of securities which might impair the company's
financial integrity or its ability to perform its public utility
responsibilities."" The commissioners further stated that the "provi-
sions of Section 204 make it a particularly unsuitable vehicle for
comprehensive licensing-type regulation,"45 and that the inquiry
should be limited solely to the financial soundness of the proposal.
The commissioners then drew an analogy between section 204 and
section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act." They emphasized the
fact that section 204 was modeled after section 20a and that, under
the Interstate Commerce Commission's interpretation, section 20a
was limited to preventing railroads from making unsound financial
arrangements which might impair the "public interest." Since Con-
gress had worded the statutes similarly, the majority of the commis-
sioners maintained that the interpretations given the provisions
should be correspondingly similar. 47
Commissioner Morgan vigorously dissented in Pacific Power &
Light," claiming that the majority had not merely construed the
public interest in an extremely narrow manner, but had actually
written the concept out of the statute." He declared that the major-
ity had established only three criteria for testing a securities issue
under section 204. These criteria implied that the Commission must
satisfy itself that the object of the issuance (a) is legal; (b) is within
corporate purposes; and (c) would not impair the company's ability
to perform its normal functions as ,a public utility. 5 ° Commissioner
Morgan referred to the conspicuous absence of any reference to the
"public interest" in the majority's opinion with the exception of a
cryptic proclamation that the Commission found the proposal to be
"compatible with the public interest."5 I It gave no basis for this
conclusory statement. 52
44 Id. at 626.
45 Id.
46 49 U.S.C.	 20a (1970),
47 27 F.P.C. at 627. Drawing analogies between statutes is an equivocal exercise at best
and seems particularly unsuitable where the statutory provisions are being applied by agencies
whose administrative responsibilities cover dissimilar subject matter as in the case of the FPC
and the ICC. This is graphically illustrated by the fact that the FPC used the analogy to § 20a
to restrict its interpretation of § 204 in Pacific Power & Light, while Mr. Justice Powell, in
Gulf States Utilities, agrees with the FPC's interpretation of § 204 but maintains that the
development of § 20a should in no way control the evolution of § 204. 411 U.S. at 774-75.
In any case, the FPC should have been put on notice that its interpretation of § 204 was
in jeopardy after the Supreme Court decided Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United
States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967), where the Court explicitly rejected the ICC's interpretation of
§ 20a. See text at notes 103-08 infra.
48 27 F.P.C. at 631-47 (dissenting opinion), 27 F.P.C. at 1388-98 (supplementary dissent-
ing opinion).
49
 27 F.P.C. at 1390 {supplementary dissenting opinion).
50 Id. at 1391 (supplementary dissenting opinion).
51 27 F.P.C. at 626,
52 Id. As Commissioner Loevinger has pointed out:
It is hard to escape the conclusion that as used by regulatory agencies the term
"public interest" has become bureaucratic cant which is invoked as a justification for
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Eight years later, in Gulf States Utilities, the FPC again found
the proposed securities issuance to be lawful and within corporate
purposes. In response to the Cities' claims, the Commission declared
that the alleged antitrust violations were "irrelevant to a requested
authorization of securities" 53
 under section 204. The FPC followed a
narrow interpretation which precluded consideration of anything
other than purely financial matters.
It is submitted that Commissioner Morgan's position in his
dissent in Pacific Power & Light—that the "public interest" of
section 204 includes factors which the majority ignored and which
go beyond the narrow considerations of financial soundness—should
have prevailed. The next section of this note will examine the
"public interest" standard of section 204 in the context of the Public
Utility Act of 1935 54 and the developing case law dealing with
regulatory agencies in the late 1960's. It will then be submitted that
protection of the public interest in a section 204 proceeding requires
consideration of anticompetitive allegations which can be related to
the proposed securities issue.
B. The Public Utility Act of 1935
1. Generally
Public utility holding companies were the chief targets of the
Public Utility Act of 1935. 55 Holding companies function by means
of financial and directorial domination of the operating public
utilities which they contro1. 56 Although these financial institutions
are far removed from the ultimate power consumer, Congress rec-
ognized that the effects of holding company operations affected the
public in significant respects and concluded that regulation was
necessary in the "public interest."57 Holding company actions were
not felt exclusively in the stock market. The influence of the holding
companies appeared in service, sales, construction and other con-
tracts and arrangements made and performed by means of interstate
whatever action is felt desirable or expedient at the moment without much more
meaning than social banalities such as "pleased to meet you" or "very truly yours."
Loevinger, supra note 28, at 131.
53 411 U.S. at 753. See note 5 supra.
54
 The Federal Power Act is Part II of Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat.
803 (1935). Title' I of the Act, 49 Stat. 803-38 (1935), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1970), is
designated the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and gives the Securities and
Exchange Commission regulatory authority over the operations of public utility holding
companies, Title II of the Act is composed of two parts: Part I, 49 Stat. 838-47 (1935),
contains amendments to the original Federal Water Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1970);
Part II, 49 Stat. 847-63 (1935), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-25r (1970), contains additions to the Federal
Water Power Act, and gives the FPC jurisdiction over the operations of operating public
utility companies. The short title of the Federal Water Power Act was also changed to the
Federal Power Act. 49 Stat. 863 (1935).
55 411 U.S. at 758.
56 See 79 Cong. Rec. 10,316 (1935).
" Id. at 10,317-18.
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commerce, and in the transportation of gas and electricity by in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce. This influence was height-
ened by the lack of effective state control when holding company
operations extended over one state's boundaries. 58 From section 1(b)
of the Holding Company Act, it is apparent that the "national public
interest" is a concept distinct from either "the interest of investors
in the securities of holding companies and their subsidiary com-
panies and affiliates,"59 or "the interest of consumers of electric
energy . . ."60 Each of these interests is related to the others, but
an identity among the terms is definitely not indicated.
The scope of the "public interest" in the Federal Power Act is to
be found within the context and concepts of the Act as a whole."
Broadly, the scope is the extent to which the FPC's regulatory
powers may be employed to ensure adequate and reliable supplies of
electric energy to consumers through the most economical and
efficient allocation and coordination of resources in the electric
power industry. 62 Section 201(a) of the Federal Power Act states:
It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling
electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is
affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation
of .. . generation ... transmission ... and sale of such
energy in interstate commerce is necessary in the public
interest. 63
Furthermore, section 202(a) of this Act instructs the Federal Power
Commission that: .
For the purpose of assuring an abundant supply of electric
energy throughout the United States with the greatest pos-
sible economy and with regard to the proper utilization and
conservation of natural resources, the Commission is em-
powered . . . to divide the country into regional districts
for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of
facilities for the generation, transmission, and sale of elec-
tric energy . . . It shall be the duty of the Commission to
promote and encourage such interconnection and coordina-
tion within each such district . . . . 64
58 See 15 U.S.C.	 79a(a) (1970).
59 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1970).
69 Id.
61 Accord, United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491, 508 (1970); cf. United States v. Lowden,
308 U.S. 225, 230 (1939). The FPC agrees that the content of the public interest must be
found by viewing the Act as a whole. Pacific Power & Light Co. v. FPC, III F.2d 1014, 1017
(9th Cir. 1940).
62 454 F.2d at 951-52.
63 16 U.S.C.	 824(a) (1970).
64 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
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The FPC recognized that the goal of assuring abundant, reliable
sources of electric energy is its primary responsibility in the National
Power Survey (the Survey), first conducted in 1964. 65 One of the
major focal points of the Survey was an exploration of coordination
and cooperation between power facilities as a means of achieving
these abundant and reliable sources of energy.
The Survey suggested means for the nation's electric power
systems to move from isolated or segmented operations,
and from existing pools of limited scope, to participation in
fully coordinated power networks covering broad regional
areas. The major purpose of the Survey was to highlight
possible patterns of expansion that could reduce utility
costs and to indicate the magnitude of potential cost
savings. 66
Pooling arrangements are a principal means for ensuring reliable
and adequate supplies of energy at substantial cost savings. 67 The
FPC agrees that more interconnection would serve "the highest
public interest." 68
In view of the present energy crisis, 69
 it is incumbent upon the
FPC that it do its utmost within its statutory power to further the
goals it promulgated in the Survey. Energy problems show no signs
of abating in the near future; therefore, coordination of energy
production becomes increasingly imperative if the United States is to
continue to enjoy an abundant supply of energy. 7 °
" The National Power Survey
represented a major effort to meet the Commission's statutory responsibility under
the Federal Power Act to promOteand encourage the interconnection and coordina-
tion of facilities for the generation, transmission and sale of electric energy with the
greatest possible economy and with regard to proper utilization and conservation of
natural resources.
Bagge, The Federal Power Commission, 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 689, 717 (1970). See
also L. Kohlmeier, Jr., supra note 28, at 190.
Bagge, supra note 65, at 717.
67 See Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust
Policy, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 64, 102-04 (1972); L. Kohlmeier, Jr., supra note 28, at 190.
66
 See L. Kohlmeier, Jr,, supra note 28, at 190.
69 See J. Holdren & P. Herrera, Energy: A Crisis in Power 9-11 (1971); Warren, Facing
the Energy Challenge, 91 Pub. Util. Fort. 31 (March 29, 1973).
" Administrative agencies "are supposed to protect the present and future interests of
consumers, employees, investors, and the Government." Economic Report of the President
108 (1970), as quoted in Baker, The Antitrust Division, Department of Justice: The Role of
Competition in Regulated Industries, 11 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 571, 588 (1970). Cf. Mr.
Justice Jackson's opinion in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 628-60 (1944)
(separate opinion). Speaking of the "public interest" with respect to the natural gas industry,
he stated that it included: (a) investor interest, (b) consumer interest, and (c) the long-range
public interest which requires stopping unjust impoverishment of future generations. Id. at
656-57. Although Mr. Justice Jackson did not view the electric power industry as under the
same resource limitations in 1944 as natural gas, the status of electric power generation today
may be compared to the crisis he perceived with regard to natural gas production in 1944.
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2. Section 204 of the Federal Power Act
Section 204 is not an isolated component of the FPC's regula-
tory responsibility but is an integral part of the Federal Power Act. 7 '
It was incongruous for the FPC to maintain that considerations of
anticompetitive conduct are proper under sections 202, 203, 205,
206 and 207 72
 but not under section 204. The Supreme Court has
observed that there is nothing in the language of section 204 whiCh
implies that the scope of the agency's investigations should be nar-
rower than that of other sections, or that the investigations should
be limited to purely financial matters. 73
 Furthermore, one of the
most significant aspects of the standards established by the Court in
section 204 is that the Commission, may approve a securities issue
"only if it finds that such issue . . . is . . . compatible with the public
interest."74
 All factors relevant to such a determination must be
considered, 78 and the conclusions as to these factors must be clearly
indicated in the record. 76 Anything short of full consideration of the
relevant factors followed by an adequate disposition in the record is
thus a breach of statutory duty. 77 As will be shown below, 78 the
"public interest" delineated in section 204 is not limited to financial
considerations alone. The failure to include anticompetitive issues in
the record is a failure to meet the statutory standard—since confor-
mity with the "public interest" had not been properly determined by
the FPC, the securities in Gulf States Utilities could not be issued
consistent with section 204.
The insertion in section 204 of the phrase "public interest" does
not suggest a restrictive view of the section. However, under the
Commission's interpretation of its section 204 duties, the phrase was
an irrelevant congressional insertion; the range of the FPC's inquiry
in Pacific Power & Light and Gulf States Utilities would not have
been different had these words been omitted. The Commission
created an identity between the "public interest" and the other
standards enumerated in section 204. That is, once the Commission
found that the purpose of the issuance was lawful and would not
impair the company's ability to perform its public utility duties, the
Electric power is not in unlimited supply; it cannot forever be produced without adversely
affecting the environment and depleting natural resources. See generally J. Holdren & P.
Herrera, supra note 69, at 26-143; Morris, Energy Demand and Its Effect on the Environment
(Rand Paper No. P-5048, 1973).
71 411 U.S, at 757-59.
72 16 U.S.C. § 824a, 824b, 824d, 824e and 824f (1970), respectively. 411 U.S. at 757.
411 U.S. at 757-59.
74 Federal Power Act § 204, 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
75 Scenic Hudson Perservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965);
accord, 411 U.S. at 759. However, "the agency should not be required to decide issues ..
which are remote from its central responsibility." L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action 521 (1965),
76 Cf. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (1970).
77 354 F.2d at 620-21.
713 See text at notes 79-104 infra.
589
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Commission declared that the public interest requirement was
satisfied." Even if-the FPC had been correct in its narrow interpre-
tation of section 204 in 1962, it should have modified that narrow
view as the nature of the "public interest" changed. The "public
interest" should not be a static concepts° but a dynamic device
which must be allowed to develop with the changing realities which
call for different approaches to the regulation of an industry."
3. The Public Interest and Anticompetitive Practices
Even though a definition of the "public interest" cannot be
formulated which will apply to all regulatory agencies, certain
themes stand out in court decisions which elucidate the concept of
the "public interest" for specific agencies. 82 One theme which ap-
pears in many decisions is the national policy to encourage competi-
tion through application of the antitrust laws: 83
[T]he antitrust laws are merely another tool which a reg-
ulatory agency employs to a greater or lesser degree to give
"understandable content to the broad statutory concept of '
the 'public interest.' "84
In this statement, Judge J. Skelly Wright reflects the attitude present
in the judiciary which urges a regulatory agency to advance anti-
trust goals. There are two major ideas embodied in this attitude.
First, the antitrust laws, since they reflect a national policy in favor
of competition, are integral to the concept of the "public interest."
Secondly, the antitrust laws are guidelines which the agency may
use, to a greater or lesser degree, to evaluate actions of companies
within its regulatory control." The following four cases will illus-
trate instances in which the antitrust laws were found to be appro-
79
 411 U.S. at 757. This also places a correspondingly narrow interpretation upon the
term "lawful" in 204, since the Commission did not think that the antitrust laws were
included in this term. Id. at 759.
/113
 There are grave dangers for the viability of the regulatory agency itself if such a
"generalized" concept is given a static meaning and that meaning outlives its usefulness and
relevance but is not abandoned. See L. Jaffe, supra note 75, at 13-18.
81
 See Bagge, supra note 65, at 719; Comment, Administrative Agencies, the Public
Interest, and National Policy: Is a Marriage Possible?, 59 Geo. L.J. 420, 426, 441-44 (1970).
s: Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390
U.S. 238 (1968); Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
83
 The policy 'of encouraging competition is not the only concept which is contained in
the "public interest." For example, one other primary concern of the FPC, when it acts under
its licensing authority, is the effect which the proposed construction of a power facility will
have on recreational, historic and scenic resources. Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 614.
84
 Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1968), quoting
Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 244
(1968).
85
 399 F.2d at 961; accord, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373-75
(1973). See also Baker, supra note 70, at 584.
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priate guidelines for the determination of the "public interest" with
respect to the regulatory agencies involved.
In Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 86 the FPC had evaluated
two proposals for transporting natural gas through the Great Lakes
region of the United States and Canada. The Commission approved
one company's proposal and rejected the other. The unsuccessful
company maintained that the FPC had given insufficient considera-
tion to the actual or potential lessening of competition in the success-
ful company's plan. The central issue was whether the "public
interest" had been given adequate protection by the FPC's consider-
ation of antitrust law violations in the proceeding under section 7(c)
of the Natural Gas Act. 87 The court concluded that the FPC had
failed in its duty, and remanded the case to the Commission to
review the applications in light of the relevance of the antitrust laws
to regulatory agencies which the court expressed as a theory of
"complementary regulation." 88 Judge Wright, writing for the court,
maintained that the antitrust laws and the powers of regulatory
agencies are complementary. Both the antitrust laws and the reg-
ulatory agencies: (a) are forms of economic regulation; (b) have as
their goal the achievement of the most efficient possible allocation of
resources (governmental control through administrative agencies is
direct, while control through the antitrust laws is indirect); and (c)
seek to establish an atmosphere which will stimulate innovations for
better service at lower cost." The court maintains that recent Su-
preme Court decisions appear to agree with this theory in that they
held that regulated industries must, to some extent at least, accom-
modate the antitrust laws. 9° Judge Wright further points out that
this theory is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's statement
in Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika
Linien" that "[b]y its very nature an illegal restraint of trade is in
some ways 'contrary to the public interest'." 92 Since the court con-
cluded that the FPC had taken insufficient account of the anticom-
petitive effects of the proposal it had approved, the court remanded
the case to the FPC for further consideration. 93
In the Svenska Amerika Linien case, the Federal Maritime
Commission (FMC) had disapproved two practices of transatlantic
passenger steamship conferences known as the "tying rule" (which
86
 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
87
 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970). See 399 F.2d at 957-58.
The "public interest" declaration of 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1970) bears great resemblance to
§ 202 of the Federal Power Act; 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1970). Section 202(a) is set forth in the
text at note 64 supra,
gg
 399 F.2d at 959-60.
89
 Id. at 959. See also Comment, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 812, 812-13 (1970).
9g
 399 F.2d at 959-60. See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973).
9 ' 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
92
 Id. at 244, cited in 399 F.2d at 960.
93 399 F.2d at 977.
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prohibited travel agents who book passage on ships participating in
the conferences from selling passage on competing, non-conference
lines) and the "unanimity rule" (which required unanimous action by
.conference members before the maximum rate of commissions pay-
able to travel agents could be changed)." The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit had concluded that according to the
statutory language of section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 95 the
Commission could not disapprove of these rules merely because they
run counter to antitrust principles. 96
The Supreme Court, however, specifically disapproved the "ex-
cessively formalistic" reading given section 15 of the Shipping Act
by the court of appeals, 97 and approved the Federal Maritime
Commission's interpretation of the 'public interest' as encompassing
investigation of antitrust issues. 98 The Court stated that the anti-
trust test formulated by the FMC was "an appropriate refinement of
the statutory 'public interest' standard." 99
Considering the closely regulated banking industry, the Su-
preme Court, in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,'"
held that the 'proposed merger between the Philadelphia National
Bank and Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank would have anticom-
petitive consequences sufficient to warrant application of the anti- •
trust laws."' Rejecting the claim that enforcement of the antitrust
laws regarding banks would have detrimental effects upon the na-
tional economy, the Court declared that, Isjubject to narrow
qualifications, it is surely the case that competition is our fundamen-
tal national economic policy . . . . There is no warrant for declining
to enforce it in the instant case."" 2
The issue facing the Supreme Court in Denver & Rio Grande
Western R.R. v. United States 103 was very similar to that in Gulf
States Utilities. Denver involved an interpretation of section 20a of
the Interstate Commerce Act,'° 4 the section which the FPC referred
to in Pacific Power & Light as almost identical to section 204 of the
Federal Power Act."5
 In Denver, the Interstate Commerce Corn-
mission (ICC) had refused to hold a hearing to consider allegations
of possible violations of antitrust laws which might result from a
proposed sale of stock under section 20a. The ICC held that consid-
• eration of antitrust issues would not be appropriate before the effects
94 390 U.S. at 240.
95 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
96 351 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
97 390 U.S. at 244.
9R Id.
99 Id. at 246.
100 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
101 Id. at 354-55, 371-72.
105 Id. at 372.
103 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
104 49 U.S.C. § 20a (1970).
L OS Sec text at notes 46-47 supra.
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of the sale were definitely established. In rejecting this position, the
Court said:
Common sense and sound administrative policy point to
the conclusion that such broad statutory standards [i.e.,
"consistent with the public interest"] require at least some
degree of consideration of control and anti-competitive
consequences when suggested by the circumstances sur-
rounding a particular transaction.'"
Reasoning in the same vein, the Court in Gulf States Utilities
declared that "[w]ithout a more definite indication of a contrary
legislative purpose, we shall not read out of § 204 the requirement
that the Commission consider matters relating to both the broad
purposes of the Act and the fundamental national economic policy
expressed in the antitrust laws."'" In Denver, the Court also refer-
red to the ICC's specific task in determining the public interest:
[T]he ICC is required, as a general rule, under its duty to
determine that the proposed transaction is in the "public
interest" and for a "lawful object," to consider the control
and anticompetitive consequences before approving stock
issuances under § 20a(2).'° 8
From these cases, it is clear that competition is one of the basic
elements of the public interest and that the antitrust laws are de-
signed to further competition. It therefore follows that the antitrust
laws must be considered by the agency if the circumstances sur-
rounding a transaction within the agency's jurisdiction have an-
ticompetitive overtones. ) 09
III. TiE EFFECT of Gulf States Utilities oN
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Mr. Justice Powell stated that a major effect of the Court's
decision in Gulf States Utilities is that it will place the securities of
operating public utilities at a disadvantage with respect to the se-
curities of public utility holding companies on the securities
market.'" He claimed that now a greater burden would be placed
upon the operating company seeking authorization for a securities
issue from the Federal Power Commission than is placed upon a
ID6 387 U.S. at 492.
1tl7 411 U.S. at 759. See also Otter Tan, 410 U.S. at 374.
in 387 U.S. at 498. Referring to Denver, the Court in Gulf States Utilities stated: "We
perceive no reason to view the responsibility placed on the FPC under § 204 differently from
the ICC's responsibility under § 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act." 411 U.S. at 761. This
analogy, although helpful, does present difficulties. See note 47 supra.
l' Cf. Baker, supra note 70, at 584, 586.
110
 411 U.S. at 772.
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holding company requesting similar authorization from the Sec-
urities and Exchange Commission (SEC). However, a comparison of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Federal
Power Act, its companion legislation, leads to a contrary conclusion.
In issuing securities, public utility holding companies must con-
form to even more stringent regulations, embodied in the Holding
Company Act, than the regulations which operating utilities must
observe. Consider, for example, the intricate checks placed on the
issuance of securities in section 7 of the Holding Company Act.'"
The "public interest" is a crucial consideration for the SEC when
evaluating an application for a securities issue." 2 Also, the SEC
may establish rules for the "maintenance of competitive conditions"
among holding companies which they are compelled to obey." 3 The
SEC's obligation with respect to any violation of a provision of the
Holding Company Act, its own rules or other applicable 'laws is
identical to the duty of the FPC." 4
Furthermore, the Court's opinion supports the conclusion that a
regulatory agency's duty and authority to investigate matters in the
"public interest" are directly connected to the scope of its regulatory
powers. 115 Although the Court did not have occasion to rule on the
court of appeals' disposition of the companion case in Gulf States
Utilities, it did quote the lower court's statement bearing on the
propriety of the SEC's refusal to entertain charges of anticompetitive
conduct connected with the securities issue. 16 Concerning the
SEC's responsibilities, the court of appeals said:
[T]he general doctrine requiring an agency to take account
of antitrust considerations does not extend to a case like the
one before us where the antitrust problem arises out of
operations of the regulated company . . . and the agency,
here the SEC, has not been given any regulatory juris-
diction over operations of the company. The SEC has
no jurisdiction over operations and stands in a different
posture from the FPC which ... has regulatory jurisdic-
tion over operations . . 17
The court of appeals left open the possibility that the SEC would be
required to hold hearings on anticompetitive allegations "if the pur-
pose of the utility's sale of securities is . . . shown to have a
"' 15 U.S.C. § 79g (1970).
" 2
 See, e.g., §§ 1, 6, 7 and 12 of the Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a, 79f, 79g
and 791 (1970).
13 15 U.S.C. § 791(d) (1970).
" 4
 Compare § 18(1) of the Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79r(f) (1970), with § 314(a)
of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825m(a) (1970).
us See 411 U.S. at 758-59.
116 Id. at 754-55 n.4.
117 454 F.2d at 955.
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reasonable nexus to matters within the SEC's jurisdiction under
other provisions [of the Holding Company Attl."" 8
Therefore, the interpretation given to matters which the SEC
must investigate in the "public interest" when considering an au-
thorization to issue securities is congruent with the interpretation
given the phrase in the FPC's domain. Accordingly, it does not
appear that the securities of holding companies will have any great
advantage, if any advantage at all, over the securities of operating
companies. What does seem to follow from the decision in Gulf
States Utilities is that public utilities (and holding companies) will
be more reticent about contravening the antitrust laws since it may
jeopardize their ability to raise necessary capital.
CONCLUSION
In summary, it is submitted that the Federal Power Commis-
sion took an antiquated view of its responsibilities when it ruled that
the Cities' antitrust claims were irrelevant under a section 204
proceeding. When the Cities alleged that Gulf States was engaging
in anticompetitive conduct, the FPC should have reconsidered its
1962 decision in Pacific Power & Light and should have brought
itself in line with the Supreme Court's decisions affecting other
administrative agencies dealing with similar matters. Thus, the de-
cision in Gulf States Utilities brings the FPC up to date and estab-
lishes a standard for section 204 proceedings which is in conformity
with the current conception of the "public interest."
LARRY E. BERGMANN
Labor Law—Antitrust Liability of Labor Unions—Connell Con-
struction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100.'—Plaintiff, Connell Construc-
tion Co. (Connell), a general contractor in the construction industry
in Texas, initially instituted this suit against defendant, Plumbers
Local 100 (the Union), in Texas state court, alleging that picketing
by the Union of Connell's construction project for the purpose of
forcing Connell to sign an agreement not to employ nonunion sub-
contractors violated the antitrust laws of Texas. 2
 The Union re-
118
 Id. at 956.
' 483 F.2d 1154, 84 L.R.R.M. 2001 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3631
(U.S. May 14, 1974).
2
 Tex. Code Ann. §* 15.02-.04. The text of . the proposed agreement was as follows:
WHEREAS, the contractor and the union desire to make an agreement apply-
ing in the event of subcontracting in accordance with Section 8(e) of the Labor
Management Relations Act;
WHEREAS, it is understood that by this agreement the contractor does not
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